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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to show the interaction effect of product market 
competition and corporate governance variables on firm performance. 
While the linkage  between  internal  governance  mechanism  and  firm 
performance is well established in several studies, the interaction between 
internal  and external  governance mechanism has  received very little 
attention   in   emerging   market   economies.   Here   we   have   shown   the 
independent and interaction effect of ownership and competition variable 
on firm level productivity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we document 
that competition has in reality become a discernible force in developing 
economies.   The   econometric   modelling   result   confirms   while   the 
standalone   effect   of   ownership   variable   on   productivity   is   mostly 
insignificant, there is a strong positive interaction effect with competition 
variables. 
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I. Introduction. 
The  prevalence of neo-classical models has obscured the institutional aspect of 
production. Since in the neo-classical model a profit-maximizing firm strives to reach 
the highest production possibility frontier given the demand and cost conditions, 
institutions per se have received little significance. Despite the path breaking work of 
Coase in 1937 on transaction cost, the emerging market literature on industry has 
evolved around the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. One inadvertent 3  Manoranjan Pattanayak and Manoj Pant/ Working Paper (2008)  DRAFT VERSION-V01
fallout of East Asian crisis is the wider acceptance of sound institutions as the pillar of 
economic success. The association between corporate governance and productivity has 
become a thrust area of research since then. In a recent study, Bartelsman and Doms 
(2000) have pointed out four factors that influence productivity growth in which firm 
ownership and control is identified as an important one. Palia and Lichtenberg’s (1999) 
study suggest that managerial ownership changes are positively related to changes in 
productivity. They have provided empirical proof of a stock market reward for firms 
with higher productivity levels. This paper advances the literature of linkage between 
corporate governance and product market competition and their effect on firm level 
productivity from an emerging market economy perspective. 
We have defined governance as synonymous with the exercise of authority, 
direction and control. In the Modern Corporation, share ownership is one of the key 
mechanism   through   which   one   can   exercise   this   control.   The   choice   of   input, 
technology, man-power and to some extent operational environment is fundamentally a 
choice made by the dominant owner. Therefore, we construe corporate governance as 
the mixture of firm’s control concentration and structure, capital structure and their 
interaction with product market competition. Competition and concentrated ownership 
can help in reducing the collective action problem present in a Modern Corporation. 
While trying to identify which corporate governance mechanism is better, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) have observed that strong legal protection of investors and some form of 
concentrated ownership are essential elements of a good corporate governance system. 
The transaction cost involved in the decision making process of giant corporations can 
be   substantially   lessened   by   concentrated   ownership   structure.   In   other   words, 
collective action problem can be resolved by partial concentration of ownership and 
control in the hands of one or a few large investors (Becht et al., 2003). 
We use total factor productivity as our measure of corporate performance. It is 
argued that productivity is a more reliable measure of firm performance than financial 
measures as accounting profit rates can be manipulated and stock prices can be biased. 
While many studies have estimated production function to determine productivity, the 
corporate governance variables have been generally ignored in the case of India (See, 
Kato, 2005). Earlier this problem has been addressed by including firm specific fixed 
effects. However, instead of treating governance variable as an unobserved firm specific 
effect, we have included such variables in the productivity estimation.
As an institutional background, India has embarked upon the path of reform 
after a balance of payment crisis in 1991. It has improved its competition climate via a 
series of changes in both domestic and trade policies. The government has started 
gradually moving out from production activities and private sector is being allowed in 
most of the industries which were earlier reserved for public sector and small scale 
industries. The salient policy change after 1991 was the ‘industrial licensing policy of 
1991’ which remarkably improved the conditions of entry for both domestic and foreign 
firms (Pant and Pattanayak, 2005). In addition, the pro-competition stance in trade and 
investment policy has been equally noteworthy. Besides making the exchange rate more 
market oriented, the trade policy has eliminated quantitative restrictions on imports, 
cut import tariffs and done away with selective protection for the small-scale industries. 
These institutional changes have impacted almost every sphere of economic activities 
and set the stage for this study. Finally, the passage of the Competition Act,2002 and 
subsequent amendments have brought competition to the centre of regulatory concerns 
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This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a brief 
overview of the literature. Section III then sets out our explanatory model and the 
principal hypotheses. The results of the estimation are presented in Section IV while 
Section V concludes the paper.
II. Theoretical Background and Evidence
II.1. Does Competition Matter? 
Internal as well as global competition in the firm’s product market is a potent 
force in ensuring good corporate governance. It could limit the managerial discretion. 
Micro-economic theory suggests that competition forces price to equal marginal cost, 
which brings about allocative efficiency. Competition in the product market ensures 
that best firms in the industry survive and also  fosters managerial incentive to perform. 
Therefore, if the product market is sufficiently competitive, management will be 
constrained to act in accordance with shareholders’ interests, or else succumb   to 
bankruptcy.
The literature suggests that competition can reduce agency problems between 
owners and managers (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958). In one paper, Hart (1983) has 
differentiated between the entrepreneurial firm and the managerial firm and has shown 
the ultimate reduction in cost of production when the managerial firm competes with 
the entrepreneurial firm. Schmidt (1997) argues intense competition has two effects on 
the manager’s optimal effort. Greater competition lowers the price that the firm 
receives for its output and, ceteris paribus, increases the risk that the owner will find it 
optimal to liquidate the firm. Therefore, the manager has an increased incentive to work 
harder to avoid liquidation. However, since increased competition reduces profits it 
may reduce the benefits of a cost reduction. The owner may not be interested in paying 
the manager the high rents necessary to achieve a cost reduction. In the Schumpeterian 
firm widening price-cost margin acts as an incentive to innovation. As competition 
lowers the margin, it may retard the pace of organic growth of firm due to lower R&D 
expenditure and hence innovation. In the same vein, Smirlock and Marshall (1983) have 
expressed doubt on the efficacy of competition and argued that imperfect information, 
costly monitoring and difficulties in enforcement of contract may not completely 
eliminate managerial discretionary behaviour in a competitive market.
While   there   is   imperfect   convergence   in   theoretical   models,   most   of   the 
empirical evidence suggests a positive impact of competition on firm productivity. 
Nickel  et al. (1997) estimate the effect of product market competition, shareholder 
control, and debt levels on firm level productivity growth in U.K. They find a positive 
impact of product market competition, ownership control, and financial pressure on 
productivity growth.
i Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) find a positive impact of competition 
on productivity of Polish firms. Griffith (2001) finds for U.K firms that an increase in 
productivity level and growth due to competition occurs in principal-agent type firms, 
and not in those where managerial control and ownership are more closely related.
ii 
Anderson et al. (1999) find perfectly competitive firms having double the efficiency of 
monopolies in case of Mongolian firms. Januszewski et al. (1999) examined the role of 
product market competition and corporate governance as determinants of productivity 
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94. They find a negative impact of rent on productivity growth, indicating that product 
market competition has a positive impact on productivity growth.
In another study, Koke (2001) finds that German firms under concentrated 
ownership have higher productivity growth. This effect is larger for firms which are 
earning lower rents. Habib and Ljungqvist (2003) have examined the effect of product 
market competition, as measured by a Herfindahl index based on four-digit SIC codes, 
on firm value. They provide evidence that firm value is positively related to product 
market competition. Beiner  et al. (2004) find that more intense product market 
competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers and the 
positive influence of competition on incentive schemes is stronger for firms operating in 
a high competitive environment. However, they obtain a positive but insignificant 
relation between firm value and product market competition. Finally, Kato (2005) has 
studied the impact of competition and debt intensity on productivity of Indian firms. He 
finds   higher   productivity   growth   for   smaller   firms   when   the   market   is   less 
concentrated. 
II.2. Competition and Corporate Governance 
In governance studies, though it is imperative to examine the degree of influence 
of different variables on firm performance, it is also necessary  to study their mutual 
interaction. Independently they can constrain the managerial discretion or can induce 
mangers/insiders to align their interest with shareholders interest. On the other hand, 
there may be some complementarity or substitutability relation between different 
variables. Specifically, competition and corporate governance indicators may move in a 
particular direction or in opposite direction while affecting productivity. When they 
move together and in the same direction, we say they are complementary. When they 
move in the opposite direction, then they are substitutes. Product market competition 
restricts managerial discretion and therefore acts as an alternate mechanism to other 
corporate governance variables. Also, it can strengthen certain market forces. For 
example, higher competition can dampen   corporate profit thereby eroding market 
value of shares. It may signal for a corporate takeover, thereby putting pressure on 
managers to perform well (Roe, 2004). When the devices are complementary, the 
impact   of product  market  competition  would  be  greater  in  firms  with  efficient 
governance structure.
The substitution effect implies when corporate governance is weak; competition plays 
an important role as a disciplinary device forcing mangers to improve performance and 
reduce slack. If competition and corporate governance were complements, product 
market competition might not alone be sufficient to reduce productive inefficiencies in 
an environment with poor corporate governance. A number of theoretical papers 
investigate the effects of competition and corporate governance on firm performance. 
Aghion and Howitt (1997) and Aghion  et al. (1999) developed a model in which 
competition appears as a substitute to good corporate governance which is measured 
by financial pressure at the firm level. On the other hand, Holmström and Milogrom 
(1994) analyze initiative and various incentive mechanisms as complementary in a 
multitask principal-agent framework. 
The empirical evidence is not unambiguous in its findings. Nickell et al. (1997) find that 
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(weak) substitute for product market competition in case of UK firms. They find rent to 
be negatively related to total factor productivity (TFP) growth; whereas interest 
payment and dominant shareholder control are positively related to total factor 
productivity   growth.   They   confirm   that   the   last   two   factors   can   substitute   for 
competition. The impact of competition on productivity performance is lower when 
firms are under financial pressure or when they have a dominant external shareholder. 
Januszewski et al. (1999) find that firms in highly competitive industries have higher 
rates of productivity growth. Furthermore, they confirm competition has a positive 
effect on productivity growth for those firms which have concentrated ownership of 
their shares (complementary effect). Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) have studied the 
interaction effect of governance and competition for the Warsaw Stock Exchange listed 
firms. They find competition to be positively affecting productivity. They confirm that 
the impact of product market competition depends on the ownership structure. Product 
market   competition   has   significant   impact   on   productivity   in   companies   whose 
ownership structure is more dispersed or more concentrated. 
With regard to China, Hu et al. (2004) find that ownership, corporate governance and 
competition are important predictors of firm performance. When they have examined 
joint effect of the above three variables, ownership and corporate governance turned 
out to be more important than competition. They have also found some substitutability 
between private ownership and competition.   Li and Niu (2006)  find moderate 
concentrated ownership and product market competition to be complementary, so also 
relative dispersed ownership and competition. They find evidence for a substitution 
effect between high concentrated ownership and competition i.e., firms with high 
concentrated ownership in competitive environment to be producing less. Koke et al. 
(2001)   have   found   complementary   effect   between   concentrated   ownership   and 
competition for German firms. They found when owner control is tight, competitive 
pressure   boosts   higher   productivity   growth.   In   a   subsequent   study,   Koke   and 
Renneboog (2005) found differential effect of competition and ownership for U.K and 
German firms. In case of U.K, weak product market competition has a negative impact 
on productivity growth of profitable, widely held firms. Block holder control has no 
impact on the productivity growth in firms which are subject to strong competition, but 
the presence of larger block holders like insiders reduces the negative impact of weak 
competition. The relation between strong block holder control and productivity growth 
is limited in case of German profitable firms. However, controlling banks, insurance 
firms, and government stakes are able to reduce the negative effects of weak product 
market competition.
Some of the studies have examined the interaction of product market competition and 
capital   structure.   Chevalier   (1995a)   finds   that   highly   leveraged   firms   are   weak 
competitors in the product market.  Kovencock and Philips (1997) also presented the 
case that firm leverage and product market competition is important in determining 
future firm performance.
III. The Hypothesis.
III.1. Productivity as a Measure of Performance
Productivity is an indicator of long term performance of firms. It shows the potential for 
growth and tends to have more stable effects on firm value. Hitherto most of the studies 
have focused on the relationship between ownership and firm value i.e., Tobin’s Q. 
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future performance. While calculating Tobin’s Q, we take a single day’s stock price 
information at the end of the year. If the capital market is highly volatile, then Tobin’s Q 
may misrepresent the performance of the firm. Hence, accounting for firm performance 
by way of productivity as against Tobin’s Q or profitability may reduce random noise 
due to price changes or stock market volatility. 
In one study, Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) have used productivity as a measure of firm 
performance. They confirm that stock market rewards higher productivity firms with 
higher Q values. Similarly, Allen et al. (1989) show that growth in equilibrium firm 
profits and the values of stock price index are both increasing functions of the 
exogenous productivity growth rate They argue that share price data can be used to 
make inferences about the rate of productivity growth in sectors such as services. In 
aanother study, Gordon and Parsons (1985) illustrate that profit changes can be 
measured as a function of productivity and changes in price recovery while Bulan et al. 
(2005) argue that productivity is a more fundamental source of value for the firm and 
more productive firms are worth more. They find a non-monotonic relationship 
between managerial ownership and productivity. Finally, Baily and Scultze (1990) 
while analyzing the effects of an exogenous reduction in the rate of labour augmenting 
productivity growth in a one sector neoclassical growth model, show that decline in the 
growth rate of   productivity   results in a decline in the rate of profit. Therefore, 
differences between firms in productivity are likely to be positively correlated with 
differences in stock prices. In this study, we have used productivity as a measure of firm 
performance.
III. 2. The Hypotheses.
Empirical   evidence   and   some   of  the   theoretical   predictions   have   indicated   that 
competition has a positive effect on firm productivity. Competition in firm’s product 
market is a very influential force for ensuring good corporate governance. Even in the 
presence of weak internal monitoring, high product market competition may ensure 
that management does not shirk. Here, Hart (1983) argues that in the presence of 
strong competition, the amount of managerial slack would be less while Hermalin 
(1992) argues that when income effect is positive, then agency cost decreases with 
intensified product market competition. Martin (1993) predicts a negative relation 
between product market competition and managerial slack. There seems to be sufficient 
empirical evidence to suggest a positive relation between increased product market 
competition and firm performance (Nickell etal, 1997; Koke, 2001; Januszewski et al, 
1999).   It   can   be   said   that   competition   provides   a   benchmark   to   measure 
manager/insiders   performance.   Higher   product   market   competition   forces   the 
managers/insiders to focus on high performance, because if they do not, it would 
ultimately result in bankruptcy and closure of the firm. Since it ncreases the chances of 
bankruptcy, competition incites the insiders to greater effort and forces costs reduction 
necessary  to  avoid  bankruptcy.  In  addition,  competition   has   severe  reputational 
implications. As the firm’s performance would be compared with its peers, it puts lots of 
moral pressure on the family/insiders to perform. On the basis of above argument, we 
hypothesize that:
1. Competition has positive effect on productivity.
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3. The impact of insider ownership on firm productivity is stronger when competition 
in firm’s product market is intense.
The government owned financial institutions have distorted objective functions. The 
purpose of setting up of Development financial institutions in India is to foster 
industrialization.   Therefore,   the   quantum   of   debt   has   been   the   performance 
measurement criteria for them rather than the quality of loans. The amount of stock 
ownership by DFIs in companies is more of a political decisions rather than driven by 
business motives. However, institutional investors can exert pressure on management 
by offloading large amount of shares. As they have commitment to their investors, they 
will ensure that the firm is getting managed in the most efficient manner and the 
resource allocation is optimal to get best output. The efficient monitoring hypothesis 
(Pound, 1988) proposes a positive relation between institutional investors share 
ownership and firm performance. On the basis of above argument, we hypothesize that:
4. Development   financial   institutions’   shareholding   has   negative   effect   and 
institutional investors’ share holding has positive effect on firm productivity.
Business groups fill the void of missing markets for labour and capital in emerging 
economies. Group affiliated firms get access to critical resources such as technology, 
input and infrastructure from their parent firms. Also group structure provides a 
mechanism for pooling and mobilizing managerial talent across the board. Hence, we 
hypothesize here:
5. Group affiliation has a significant positive effect on firm productivity.
It is argued that debt acts as a bonding mechanism between shareholders and mangers. 
By putting constraint on the free cash flow, debt aligns the interest of the manager with 
shareholders. The signalling argument proposes a positive relation between higher 
amount of debt and firm value as investors read larger amounts of leverage as a signal 
of higher quality firm. This is because debt is a contractual obligation to repay interests 
and principals. Failures to make payments can lead to bankruptcy and managers may 
lose their jobs.  However, in India most of lending institutions are government owned. 
They thus have a soft budget constraint. Therefore, the threat of bankruptcy is very 
poor. Financial institutions have reduced incentives for monitoring their debtor firms. 
The managers of highly leveraged  firms may undertake negative net present value 
projects or involve in discretionary spending.  Second, due to accumulation of public 
debt, the companies lose their credibility in the market. Even if they have positive net 
present value projects, they have to sacrifice the project because of unavailability of 
fresh loans. Therefore, though debt may positively affect firm value as it is based on 
investors’ perception, it may negatively affect the productivity. Here, Koke et al. (2001; 
2005) has found positive effect of bank debt on productivity. Nickell et al. (1999) have 
found a positive impact of financial pressure on firm productivity. On the other hand, 
Kato (2005) has found a negative relation between debt intensity and productivity in 
case of India. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
6. Financial pressure or debt concentration has a negative effect on productivity.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
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Productivity   of   a   firm   is   determined   by   several   factors   including   competitive 
environment and ownership structure. The more apparent measure of productivity is 
the ratio of outputs to inputs. Since the firm employs several inputs, there are different 
ways   of   explaining   productivity.   In   this   study,   we   have   measured   total   factor 
productivity which is widely used in the extant literature.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as output per unit of total input, where total 
input is the weighted sum of the individual inputs:  ( , )
it
it
Y A f k l = (Palia and Lichtenberg, 
1999). Here, A denotes TFP,  ( , ) f k l denotes total input, l denotes labour input, and k  
denotes capital input. Rearranging the above equation, we can obtain a production 
function which is: * ( , ) it it it it Y A f k l = . This explains that output produced is determined 
by the quantities of inputs employed and the efficiency of the producer. Assuming  (.) f
as a Cobb-Douglas production function, we can write: * it it it it Y A l k
a b = . Taking logarithms 
we can express this as:ln ln ln ln it it it it it it y A l k a b = + + . 
If the technical parameters  a  and  b  are invariant across firms and TFP is varying 
across   firms   and   unobservable,   we   can   write   the   above   equation   as: 
ln ln ln it it it it y l k u a b = + +   where ln it it u A = .   Hence,   we   can   hypothesize   that 
productivity, it u , is related to insider ownership and competition by some functional 
form  (.) g . Now we can express the above equation as:ln ln ln (.) it it it it it y l k g e a b = + + +  
(whereln (.) it it it it A u g e = = + ). So, it g  embodies all factors that affect productivity level. 
We can express it as: it it g X c d = + , that is the level of total factor productivity is a 
function of   it X   variables. Bringing this to the primary equation, we can write: 
ln ln ln it it it it it y X l k e c d a b = + + + + .  it X  is a vector of variables that could affect the 
productivity level of a firm and  it e  is a random disturbance term, capturing all other 
shocks.  Including industry dummy, i q , and time dummy t q , the model can be expressed 
as : ln ln ln it i t it it it it y X l k e c q q d a b = + + + + + + . In the Appendix, we have defined each 
of the explanatory variables.
IV.2. Data and  Empirical Results
The data are retrieved from Prowess, a database provided by the Centre for Monitoring 
the Indian economy (CMIE). The initial sample consists of 1,833 listed firms for the 
period 2000-01 to 2003-04. Firms for which there is no shareholding data, stock price 
data and sales data are dropped from the sample. We have not included firms which are 
classified as diversified for this productivity analysis which resulted in dropping of 26 
firms (i.e., 104 firm years). Firms for which gross fixed assets, gross value added or 
wages and salaries are missing are also dropped in the modelling process. Our final 
sample consists of 1,660 listed firms.
To measure corporate governance, this study used data on ownership structure, 
leverage   and   business   group   information.   The   main   variable   used   to   measure 
ownership is the share holding of insiders/promoters. In the governance structure of 
Indian corporate, insiders/promoters plays a larger role. In the context of India, 
promoter control, founding family control, ownership control, ownership concentration, 
and management control have a similar meaning. The promoter/family characterizes a 
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and often controls senior management. Since the state run financial institutions rarely 
go against the promoters, the decision making process in the firm is more or less 
determined by this class of shareholders (Varma, 1997). It is argued that the problem of 
corporate governance in India is not that of disciplining management rather it is of 
disciplining dominant shareholder. Promoters are the dominant shareholder in India. 
Therefore, it is imperative to study the impact of this class of shareholders on firm 
productivity.
Another ownership variable of equal interest is of institutional investors. Institutional 
investors being a major block holder in a company can influence firm performance. 
They can exert influence through voice option or exit option. The greater amount of 
shareholding by institutional investors makes monitoring more rational. However, they 
can sell instead of intervening when they find large scale managerial problems. In India, 
institutional investors have large amounts of investment in companies and therefore 
the potential for institutional monitoring is greater than it is in the market-dominated 
economies like the US and the UK. Besides that, we have included three more ownership 
variables such as foreign, DFIs and Corporate. We have also included the capital 
structure variable which is measured as total borrowings to total assets. An alternative 
measure of leverage has been used which we will discuss later.
To measure product market competition, we have created four variables i.e., CR4, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), Rent and Market Share (MKT-SH). To note here, 
CR4 and HHI are the most important variable through which we have captured 
incentive power of market discipline. The concentration index, CR4, is defined as the 
sum of the largest four firms share in their respective product market (defined by NIC-2 
digit output).
iii It is very difficult to determine what the relevant market is for a firm. 
Though a 4 or 5 digit NIC classifications will be a more precise proxy for the firm’s 
market, it will be too restrictive for a significant proportion of firms which operate in 2, 
3 or 4 digit industries. If we identify a firm as belonging to 4 digit industries, we assume 
that all sales are realized in this sector. However, a part of firm’s product may belong to 
2 or 3 digit group. Therefore, there will be overstatement of firm’s market power in 4 
digit industries. On the contrary, such problems won’t arise if we use 2-digit market 
share as it does not overstate the market power of the firm (Grosfeld and Tressel, 
2001).
The higher the concentration ratio, the greater is the monopoly power or market 
concentration in the existing industry. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is defined 






/ i i p q Q = ,  i q  is output of ith firm and Qis total output of all the firms in the industry. 
The maximum value for this index is one where only one firm occupies the market. The 
HHI will be minimum (i.e., 1/n) when the n firms in the industry hold an identical share. 
HHI is a widely accepted index as it takes account of all the firms and their relative sizes 
into account. Both CR4 and HHI are inverse measure of competition because the higher 
the ratio, the less competitive is the industry/market.
Another variable ‘rent’ has been constructed to measure competition in a firm’s product 
market. It can be interpreted as an ex-post measure of market power. It exhibits above 
normal profit which reflects the overall extent of competition faced by a firm. The firms 
can generate higher rent only if they operate in a less competitive environment. In a 
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defined as total sales less labour, raw material, power and capital cost normalized by 
gross value added (Koke, 2001; Kato, 2005).
iv  
The firm’s output, it y , is defined as gross value added, deflated by whole sale price index 
with base year 1993-94. The firm’s capital,  it k , is defined as gross fixed assets, deflated 
by machinery and machine tools price index with base year 1993-94. As a robustness 
check we have generated capital stock variable which is defined as 0 1 ( ) t t k k k - + - , 
deflated by machinery and machine tools price index. We have taken gross fixed assets 
of year 2000 as 0 k .
v However, there is the problem of quality change as the different 
vintages of capital  in the above formula are of heterogeneous quality. Again, the choice 
of  0 k  is arbitrary. In our sample, the average age of firm is 26 years with median age of 
20. The range (maximum-minimum) of age variable is 139 years. Therefore, the choice 
of base period (i.e., 0 k ) is largely dependent upon the availability of GFA information for 
large number of firms which is the primary driver of choosing year 2000 as the initial 
year in our case. Hence,  0 k , neither represent the initial capital of the firm nor it shows 
the vintage of capital.  
The firm’s labour input, l, is defined as wages and salaries, deflated by consumer price 
index of industrial workers with base year 1993-94. Labour can be measured as number 
of employees, amount of man-hours (years) or in terms of wages (Varagunasingh, 
1993). The Prowess database does not provide historical data on number of employees. 
Some of the researchers have done a mapping with Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 
data   to   arrive   at   employee   numbers   (see,   Pant   and   Pattanayak,   2005   for   the 
methodology). However, the major shortcoming of this approach is the assumption of 
uniformity of wage rate in a particular industry. Also, ASI does not cover a lot of 
industries; therefore imputing their wage bill by similar industry group is another 
arbitrariness of the approach. Therefore, we have used employee cost of the firm for 
labour.
vi Other control variables are defined in the Appendix.
IV. 3.   IV. 3.  Analysis Analysis of Results  of Results
We begin our analysis with some preliminary evidence based on a measure of 
productivity. We estimate a standard two factor Cobb-Douglas production function with 
gross value added (GVA) as dependent variable, labour and capital as independent 
variable.   We   take   the   residuals   from   this   regression   as   a   measure   of   relative 
productivity (i.e., relative to the regression line). Hence we can have positive or negative 
relative productivity. We have included time and two digit industry dummies to account 
for temporal and cross-sectional shocks.
To understand the relationship between competition and productivity, we provide data 
on industry-wise productivity and concentration in Table-1. Here, we have tried to 
understand at a broad level the association between productivity and sector-wise 
concentration. The average level of concentration (i.e., CR4) in the Indian industry is 53 
percent with median value of 50 percent. This suggests a gradual evolution to a 
moderate competitive environment in Indian industry. Out of 43 industries, there are 
22 industries where CR4 is less than or equal to 50 percent and 5 industries where CR4 
is less than 30 percent. On the basis of both the measures (i.e., CR4 and HHI), industries 
such as Food and Beverages, Textiles, Chemical and Electrical Machinery are highly 
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highly non-competitive. However, these industries were in the past dominated by public 
sector firms. There are a few private players in such industries because of which it is 
showing high level of concentration.
In column 2 of the table, we have reported the direction of average productivity at the 
industry level. The four year average (2001 to 2004) of productivity shows that all the 
industries have positive relative productivity except a few like Oil and Gas, Tobacco, 
Recorded Media, Electrical Machinery and water transport. It is to be observed that 
these industries have the  highest level of concentration barring electrical machinery. 
Therefore, this provides ad-hoc evidence that industries which are non-competitive 
have negative relative productivity.
In Table-2 the relationship between insider ownership, competition and productivity 
has been shown. We have defined an industry as competitive if its concentration ratio 
(CR4) is less than median concentration (i.e., CR4<=0.4982). When insider ownership is 
more than 40 percent and the industry is competitive, the relative productivity level is 
positive. however,   when promoter share is 10-20 percent and 30-40 percent, the 
relative productivity level is negative. In case of non-competitive industries, relative 
productivity is negative even while insider ownership stake is quite large i.e., more than 
75 percent. This provides a weak evidence of complementarity between competition 
and insider ownership. Firms with large insider share have positive productivity in 
competitive industries. In case of non-competitive industries, the relationship is less 
clear..
As a further check, we have examined the level of relative productivity when insiders 
have a majority stake in a firm (i.e., >51 percent). In a competitive industry when 
insider have more than 51 percent stake, the productivity level is 2.8 percentages more 
in comparison to non-competitive industry. When insider have less than 51 percent 
stake in a firm, productivity level is low in competitive as well as non-competitive 
industries. Finally, we have examined the productivity difference between group and 
standalone firms. We have found that standalone firms are more productive than group 
firms and the mean difference is statistically significant.
We now turn to a discussion of our regression model. to examine the effects of 
ownership and competition on productivity level. All regressions are estimated using 
the fixed effects method (least square dummy variable). The coefficients on year and 
industry dummies are not reported. In Table-3, we have used CR4 as the measure of 
competition. The model-1 is our baseline specification where we include only labour, 
capital and ownership variables. The model is highly statistically significant with 
adjusted R-square value of 0.86. We observe that input share of labour in model-1 is 
0.71 and input share of capital 0.33. Both the variables are highly significant. This 
finding is  consistent with the result of Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) in case of US firms. 
The insider ownership variable (INS) is found to be positive and significant. To 
investigate   the   non-linear   relationship   between   insider   ownership   and   firm 
productivity, we have introduced a quadratic and cubic term of insider ownership.
vii We 
find the higher order terms are highly insignificant. Thus, linear specification better 
captures the relationship between managerial ownership and firm productivity than 
any form of non-linear specification.
In model-1, the next ownership variable is institutional investors’ share (IINV). In India 
among institutional investors, mutual funds, UTI and insurance companies hold the 
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the value of their portfolio. Therefore, they can be very opportunistic and offload the 
shares of the companies at the slightest sign of irregularity. As the voice option is 
costlier than exit option, they may prefer to change their portfolio allocation than 
govern the company. Sometimes they can be very short-termism and may try to 
maximize the value of shares of their customers without performing the monitoring role 
as large investors. We found a positive and significant sign of institutional investors 
(IINV) in model-1.  The positive relationship between productivity and IINV’s share 
ownership draw attention to their monitoring role as major block holder.
We find a significantly negative association between Development financial institutions 
(DFI’s) shareholding and total factor productivity (TFP). DFIs are setup with the 
objective to provide long term finance to the firms. However due to soft budget 
constraint and distorted or political objectives, they have failed to generate the 
necessary incentives for managers to boost firm productivity. The DFIs are evaluated on 
the basis of quantity of loans they have disbursed rather than the quality of loans. The 
choice to be the shareholder of a company is more or less a political decision. The 
nominee directors of DFIs play an insignificant role in the board meeting and with their 
support promoters of Indian companies sometimes enjoy managerial control with very 
little equity investment of their own (Charkrabarti, 2005). In such firms because of low 
cash flow right and higher control right, the insiders have little interest/incentive to 
manage the company properly. They can divert the resources to the company where 
they have higher amount of ownership stake (Patibandla, 2006; Chakrabarti, 2005). 
Hence, the negative relationship shows the poor monitoring role played by DFIs in the 
governance structure of a firm.
The   coefficient   of   corporate   ownership   variable   (CORPORATE)   is   positive   and 
statistically significant. This implies inter-corporate ownership has positive impact on 
firm productivity. Companies generally hold shares in firms where they have strategic 
interest. It can be an upstream firm (purchaser of final product) or downstream firm 
(supplier of raw material) or any other. Inter-corporate shareholding facilitates sharing 
of technology, basic infrastructure, managerial skills and critical knowledge. The 
financial pressure is substantially reduced because of inter-corporate lending and 
investment. Sometimes such kinds of pyramidal ownership and cross-holdings bring 
deviation in cash flow and control rights. Inter-corporate shareholding may facilitate 
inter-corporate transfer of resources to the detrimental of minority shareholders. Also, 
due to collusion among top management of companies, the threat of takeover becomes 
weak.  In   our   study,   the   positive   coefficient   of   corporate   ownership   indicates   the 
performance enhancing role played by corporate shareholder.
We found a positive influence of foreign ownership (FOREIGN) on firm productivity. The 
size of the point estimate is larger than any other ownership variable.
viii Since foreign 
ownership   also   represents   foreign   institutional   investors   (FII),   it   indicates   the 
performance monitoring role played by FIIs.
ixIn model-2, we have included competition, 
leverage and other control variables. To measure competition, CR4 variable is used in 
the model.
x The sign of CR4 is negative which implies higher the industry competition; 
lower is the productivity level of firms. However, we find the variable to be insignificant 
in the model. It indicates competition as such does not have any disciplinary effect and it 
does not enhance firm productivity. This finding is being supported by the empirical 
evidence provided by Koke (2001). In this model and in the subsequent models, the 
IINV variable becomes insignificant. Hence, institutional investors may not contribute to 
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scale sale and purchase of shares. But, their influence on firm productivity is very 
negligible or statistically insignificant. The other variable of interest is business group 
indicator (Group).  The dummy variable (i.e., 1-Group, 0-others) is insignificant which 
means group or network structure does not have any impact on productivity. 
Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of sales i.e., Ln(S). As per economies of scale 
and scope argument, firm size and productivity is positively associated. Here, we find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between firm size and productivity. With 
respect to other control variables,  research and development intensity (R&D) and 
advertisement intensity (ADV) have positive impact on firm productivity.  Firms with 
higher R&D intensity are expected to have higher productivity as high R&D firms are 
more foresighted and have a higher scope for innovation. The development of cost-
cutting   technology   is   possible   only   in   high   R&D   firms.   Similarly,   advertisement 
expenditure is a soft capital. Higher amount of advertisement spending helps in building 
brand name and develop customer-loyalty.  Though we cannot establish a priori a 
relationship between advertisement and productivity, we find a positive association in this 
study.
In the post-reform era, the scope of importing capital goods has increased in India. 
Recently Ray (2004) and Goldar, Renganathan and Banga (2004) have found that 
import intensity and technology import payment intensity has positive impact on firm 
productivity and efficiency. Since liberalization of external controls and with removal of 
quantitative restriction on capital goods, the access of Indian companies to outside 
world has increased tremendously. Due to imports of materials and machineries with 
advanced technology, it is expected that the productivity level will increase. In this 
study, we have taken import of capital goods intensity (CAPIMP-INT) as a predictor of 
firm productivity.  The estimated relationship suggests that firms with higher level of 
imported capital goods have  higher productivity.
We measure vertical integration (VERTICAL) of a firm by the ratio of gross value added 
to value of output (Goldar et al., 2004). There are several studies which indicate a higher 
performance   of   vertically   integrated   firms   (Kerkvliet,   1991;   Mansson,   2004). 
Integration can have both positive   and negative impacts on firm productivity and 
efficiency. The downstream integration can have positive effects as inputs will be 
available at lower cost. At the same time, there can be substantially reduction in input 
quality as the firm sacrifices purchasing from a competitive market. Integration may be 
beneficial from a transaction cost perspective. The possibility of hold-up problem will 
be reduced significantly and the cost of negotiation and bargaining will be very minimal. 
In this study, we find a positive impact of integration (VERTICAL) on firm productivity. In a 
recent study, Goldar et al. (2004) also find a similar e relationship between vertical 
integration and technical efficiency. 
The next control variable is EXCISE which is measured as the ratio of excise tax paid to 
value of output (Goldar et al., 2004). Higher excise tax rate has detrimental effect on 
production. It will affect productivity and efficiency only when it influences the 
allocation of resources. A negative association between EXCISE and productivity is 
expected as the likelihood of excise tax affecting internal resource allocation is very high. 
In model-2, the sign of variable ‘EXCISE’ is negative and statistically significant.  The 
result suggests that firms subject to higher rates of excise duty have a lower level of 
productivity. The variable DEP-INT i.e., depreciation intensity measures the vintage of 
capital and controls for the technology used in the firms. We find that firms with higher 15  Manoranjan Pattanayak and Manoj Pant/ Working Paper (2008)  DRAFT VERSION-V01
depreciation intensity are having lower level of productivity. The depreciation rate will 
be higher in the firms where the plants and machineries are old. Hence, the negative sign 
of DEP-INT variable is as per our expectation.
We have measured financial pressure of the firm by total borrowings to total assets 
(BORROW).
xi Earlier we have argued as most of the debt is from government owned 
financial institutions and public sector banks, the disciplinary effect of the debt may not 
be very high in India. Therefore, the interest payment pressure may not be too 
restrictive to induce managers to perform more. However, the cumulative borrowing 
from different government owned financial institutions may make the companies 
unfavourable for further lending. This can affect their overall financial position and they 
may face financial constraint. Hence, we expect a negative effect of financial pressure 
(BORROW) on firm productivity. Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) have measured the 
financial pressure by interest payment ratio which is defined as interest payments to 
profit before tax, depreciation and interest payments (PBDIT). They find a negative 
effect of interest payment on employment and pay-rise. But, they have found a positive 
impact of financial pressure on productivity even though the effect size is very small. 
When   we   have   used  their   measure   in   model-2,   the   estimate   turned   out   to  be 
insignificant which means the productivity level is neutral to interest payment ratio.
xii 
As we have explained above, this shows the non-disciplinary effect of interest payment. 
Koke and Renneboog (2005) have found a positive impact of bank debt on productivity 
growth for German firms. However, they didn’t find any impact of interest payment 
ratio or debt-equity ratio on productivity growth. They conclude that the degree of 
leverage is not important for monitoring rather the type of creditors matter. In this 
study, we find the effect of leverage (BORROW) on firm productivity as negative. When a 
firm has the mean level of debt-assets ratio which is 0.33, then the productivity decline 
will be of 10 percent. Thus, the rise in indebtedness of the firm reduces firm 
productivity. In the literature it is argued that when the productivity level of a firm is 
consistently low, then the firm’s reliance on debt is more as internal accruals is low. 
Therefore, debt may be negatively related to productivity (Kato, 2005).
IV.4.  I IV.4.  Interaction Between Competition and Ownership.  nteraction Between Competition and Ownership. 
We now look at the effects of corporate governance and competition on total factor 
productivity. In model-3 of Table-3 we have included the interaction variable of insider 
ownership and CR4 (i.e., CR4*INS). The sign and significance of all other variables 
remain unaltered. Now the competition variable (CR4) has become significant and 
positive.
xiii This highlights the fact that competition has little disciplinary power when it is 
considered independent of insider ownership level. The insider ownership (INS) estimate 
is positive and statistically significant. The interaction term (CR4*INS) is negative and 
statistically significant. The interaction effect of insider ownership and competition 
shows complementary nature of both the variables. As a result of the interaction effect 
in the model,  the increase in productivity with one percentage increase in insider 
ownership stake is greater, the higher the level of competition (i.e., the lower the value of 
CR4). To measure the effect we can partially differentiate the equation with respect to 







= - ; therefore when CR4 is equal to 1, the 
changes in productivity is negative (i.e., -0.418) with respect to  marginal increase in 
insider share. When CR4 is equal to 0.5 (i.e., when top four firms have 50 percent of 
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The slope of the response function when CR4 is equal to 0.3 is 0.33. Therefore,  a 
percentage increase in insider share has a lager effect on productivity when competition is 
at a higher level than when it is at a lower level. This further confirms the strong synergy 
between ownership and competition in an emerging economy.  Higher amount of 
promoter shareholding has positive impact on productivity when competition in firm’s 
product market is fierce. In a similar study, Kato (2005) could not find any effect of 
competition on productivity in case of Indian corporate sector. From this study, it is 
apparent that competition has significant effect on productivity when it is considered 
along with insider ownership.
xiv 
In Table-4 we have used different measures of competition. In model-4 we have used 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as the measure of competition. In model-5, we have 
studied the interaction of competition (HHI) and ownership (INS). In model-6, we have 
used ‘rent’ as a measure of competition and in model-8 we have applied market share as 
a proxy measure for competition. In model-4, the competition variable (HHI) is negative 
but statistically insignificant. This finding reinforces our earlier hypothesis that there is 
a significant interaction relationship between competition and insider ownership. 
Competitive pressure has very negligible effect on productivity when it is studied 
separately. Though the point estimate of HHI is -0.468 in model-4, it is not statistically 
significant. In model-5, we have introduced the interaction effect between insider stake 
and HHI. Now, the variable HHI has turned out to be positive and significant. When we 








= - . When there is only one firm in the market the HHI value 
is 1 and when the market is equally shared by all firms the HHI value turns to be 1/N. 
When HHI is equal to 1, the rise in insider share has negative effect on productivity. The 
smaller the value of HHI, higher is the competitiveness of the market. The mean 
(median) value of HHI in our sample industry is 0.15 (0.09). As a result of the 
interaction effect in the model, the increase in productivity with one unit increase in 
insider   ownership   is   greater,   the   smaller   the   value   of   HHI   (i.e.,   higher   is   the 
competition). If a firm is operating in an industry where the HHI value is industry 
average (i.e., 0.15), one unit increase in insider stake will result in 0.11 unit increase in 
productivity. The similarity in result using CR4 and HHI suggests that this finding is not 
biased because of the choice of measure of competition.
Following Koke, (2001); Koke and Renneboog, (2005); Januszewski,(1999) and Grosfeld 
and Tressel, (2001) we have used ‘rent’ which is an ex-post measure of the degree of 
competition. Rent is supposed to capture the above normal profit which will reflect the 
extent of competition faced by a firm. In model-6, the coefficient of ‘rent’ is negative and 
statistically significant. This finding provides evidence that monopoly rent is negatively 
related to productivity which is similar to the findings of Grosfeld and Tressel (2001). It 
is argued that rent is not only correlated to market power but also with profitability. 
However, if rent is acting as a proxy for profitability, then it should have a positive sign 
with productivity. To note here, we could not find any interaction effect between insider 
shareholding and rent. In model-7, we have introduced market share (MKT-SH) as a 
proxy for competition. Though the sign of the variable is as per our expectation, it 
turned out to be statistically insignificant. Also we fail to find any interaction effect 
between market share and insider ownership.
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To check the sensitivity of our findings, we have carried out several robustness tests.
xv 
First, we have used alternative definition of leverage and assessed its impact on 
productivity. There are several ways in which the term leverage has been defined 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The suitable definition for a study depends upon the 
objective of the analysis. Since there is no unique way to define leverage, we have used 
alternative measures to see the sensitivity of our previous results. Second, we have used 
perpetual inventory method (PIM) to construct capital stock variable. The variable 
‘capital stock’ has been measured in several ways. To study technical efficiency in Indian 
industry, Goldar et al. (2004) have used perpetual inventory method to construct capital 
stock. Also, they have used a multiplier to adjust for vintage of capital. Ray (2004) has 
measured the capital by adding depreciation, 15 percent of fixed assets and inventories. 
We have tested the robustness of our result by measuring capital by perpetual 
inventory method. Third, we have regressed the residuals from a two factor Cobb-
Douglas production function on several firm characteristics to examine several of our 
hypotheses. Finally, we have split the sample and estimated the production function 
only for manufacturing sector firms.
xvi
In Table-5 (A) and (B), we have used different measures of leverage. In Model-8 of 
Table-5 (A) leverage is defined as total borrowings to total paid-up equity capital. The 
variable is positive and statistically significant which goes against our earlier findings of 
a negative relationship. The model exhibits the complementary nature of insider 
ownership and product market competition. In model-9, we have defined leverage as 
long term borrowings to total assets. The variable is negative and statistically significant 
and supports our earlier evidence. Thus, the variable which shows debt concentration 
has a  negative impact on productivity. In model-10, we have taken debt-equity ratio as 
the measure of leverage or capital structure. It is defined as the ratio of total borrowings 
to net worth.
xvii We find a negative estimate for leverage which is statistically significant. 
Thus, it confirms our earlier hypothesis that as the ratio of total borrowings increases 
with respect to firm’s net worth, the productivity of the firm will be affected negatively.
In Table-5 (B), we have considered three more variables as measure of debt/leverage. 
In model-11, leverage is defined as the ratio of total borrowings to total borrowings plus 
paid-up equity capital. The estimate is negative and statistically significant. In model-12 
and 13, we have measured financial pressure by nature of debt and type of lender. In 
model-12, the variable LEVERAGE is defined as short term debt to total borrowings. 
When the amount of short term debt is high in firm’s basket of total borrowing, the 
financial pressure on firm will be very high. In model-12, the variable LEVERAGE 
confirms our earlier hypothesis that while higher amount of debt signals the quality of 
the firm or its investment opportunity, the financial pressure may reduce the productivity 
of the firm. Finally, in model-13 the variable LEVERAGE represent bank loan to total 
borrowing. Mostly bank loans are short-term in nature and bank exerts pressure on 
firms for repayment of the loan at the stipulated time. We find the variable sign to be 
negative and statistically significant. To note here, in all the models, competition variable 
has  same  complementary relation with  insider  ownership  stake.  Also,  the  control 
variables are having the same sign and significance as in table 1 and 2. 
In addition, we have changed the definition of capital stock. This has been measured by 
perpetual inventory method. With the introduction of new capital measure, we find a 
positive relationship between insider shareholding and firm productivity. The variable 
is highly statistically significant. The complementary relation between product market 
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find a change in the statistical significance. The institutional investors’ shareholding and 
group dummy variable turned out to be statistically significant. The variable ‘age’ has 
become negative and statistically significant. This suggests that older firms are more 
productive than younger firms. When we have estimated the equation only for 
manufacturing sector firm, the insider ownership, corporate ownership and foreign 
ownership variables are found positive and statistically significant. The institutional 
investors’   shareholding  and   DFI’s   shareholding   and   group   dummy  have   become 
statistically insignificant. As a final sensitivity check, we have taken the residual from a 
two factor Cobb-Douglas production function as dependent variable. We have regressed 
the residual with all other independent variables in the model. In this formulation too, 
we could establish all of our stated hypothesis and observed a complementary relation 
between competition and insider ownership on firm productivity.
V.  V. Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (ownership type 
and concentration, group affiliation, capital structure) and product market competition 
on productivity. We have used a panel of more than 1,660 firms over the years 2000-01 
to 2003-04. It is noted that ownership has a positive impact on productivity. This 
strengthens our argument that the higher amount of insider stake in Indian firm 
enhances firm efficiency and productivity which is beneficial for the whole economy. It 
provides further evidence that countries with weak legal enforcement can have better 
firm performance with moderate concentrated ownership.
Our finding of negative effect of DFI’s holding on firm productivity gives further impetus 
to the argument that government funded/raised financial institutions are poor monitors 
of   corporations.   Their   soft   budget   constraint   and   ambiguity   in   objectives   are 
detrimental  to   the   economy   as   it   erodes   firm   value   and   results   in   lower   firm 
productivity.   This   evidence   calls   for   a   change   in   Indian   financial   system.   Also, 
institutional investors do not play significant role in improving firm productivity. At 
best, their investment in large amount can boost investor’s confidence in a particular 
company. But, from a long term perspective institutional investors’ shareholding is not 
helpful in enhancing firm productivity. Corporate shareholders and FIIs are strategic 
investors. They have proven to be advantageous from a long term perspective as their 
shareholdings resulted in higher firm productivity.
The major finding of this paper relates to the complementary nature of relationship 
between insider ownership and competition. We find that firms with higher amount of 
insider stake are more productive only when competition in firm’s product market is 
intense. This finding of beneficial effect of competition is in conformity with the 
theoretical predictions and existing empirical evidence. Financial pressure or debt 
intensity is seen to have a negative impact on firm productivity. It provides further 
evidence that large amount of debt may be creating financial constraint because of 
which we observe a negative relation of debt intensity with productivity. 
These findings have some policy implications. The positive impact of increased product 
market competition on productivity requires that competition policy should aim at 
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taken several pro-competitive measures via a series of changes in both domestic and 
trade policies which is getting reflected in the complementary nature of insider 
ownership and competition .The negative effect of DFI’s ownership on firm productivity 
calls for a reversal in the goals and objectives of the institutions. Finally, the negative 
effect of debt intensity on firm productivity raises question about the long term 
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TABLES TABLES
Table 1. Sectoral Measures of Competition and Productivity
        Sector Name Average
Productivity (+,-)
CR4 HHI
· Agriculture, Hunting and Related Activities + 0.3557 0.0529
· Mining of Coal and Lignite; Extraction of Peat + 0.6767 0.2089
· Extraction of Crude petroleum and Natural gas; Service activities incidental 
to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying
- 0.9850 0.8055
· Mining of Metal Ores - 0.8597 0.1909
· Other Mining and Quarrying + 0.5007 0.0956
· Manufacture of Food Products and Beverages + 0.1531 0.0128
· Manufacture of Tobacco Products - 0.9490 0.6203
· Manufacture of Textiles + 0.1286 0.0108
· Manufacturing of Wearing Apparel, Dressing and Dying of Fur + 0.3001 0.0525
· Tanning and Dressing of Leather, Manufacture of Luggage, Handbags, 
Saddlery and Footwear
+ 0.6272 0.1853
· Manufacture of Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture, 
Manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting Materials
+ 0.5693 0.1104
· Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products + 0.3685 0.0566
· Publishing, Printing and reproduction of Recorded Media - 0.5512 0.1225
· Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum products and Nuclear Fuel + 0.8736 0.2372
· Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products + 0.2007 0.0166
· Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products + 0.3625 0.0438
· Manufacture of Other Non Metallic Products + 0.3215 0.0401
· Manufacture of Basic Metals + 0.3952 0.0631
· Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and 
Equipments
+ 0.3686 0.0502
· Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment + 0.3516 0.0654
· Manufacture of office, accounting and Computing Machinery + 0.6285 0.1287
· Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus - 0.2923 0.0346
· Manufacture of Radio, television and Communication Equipments and 
apparatus
+ 0.4661 0.0772
· Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks
+ 0.4692 0.0957
· Manufacture of Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers + 0.5078 0.0825
· Manufacture of other Transport equipment + 0.7489 0.1638
· Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing + 0.3882 0.0665
· Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply + 0.5265 0.1305
· Construction + 0.3818 0.1177
· Wholesale Trade and commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
motor cycles
+ 0.3989 0.0635
· Retail Trade, Except of motor vehicles and motor cycles, repair of personal 
and household goods
- 0.9097 0.4848
· Hotels and Restaurants + 0.4247 0.0680
· Land Transport, Transport via pipelines + 0.5988 0.2741
· Water Transport - 0.7860 0.2660
· Supporting and Auxiliary Transport activities, Activities of Travel agencies + 0.8616 0.2401
· Post and Telecommunication + 0.8512 0.3520
· Financial Intermediation, Except insurance and Pension Funging + 0.2892 0.0413
· Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation + 0.7780 0.3597
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· Computer and Related Activities + 0.4876 0.0715
· Other Business Activities + 0.4981 0.0863
· Health and Social Work + 0.7371 0.2630
· Recreational, cultural and sporting activities + 0.4721 0.0913
Notes: Productivity is approximated by the residuals from the pooled OLS estimation of a two factor Cobb-
Douglas production function including time and two digit industry dummies. Industry level average has been 
taken to arrive at the final number.














Notes: An industry is defined as competitive if its concentration ratio is less than or equal to the median 
concentration level which is 0.4982.
Table 3. Effects of Ownership and Competition (i.e., CR4) on Productivity
































































































Adj. R-square 0.8620 0.9189 0.9191






Year & Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 6638 6634 6634
Notes:
· Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
· * indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance at 15 percent level.
Table 4. Effects of Ownership and Competition (i.e., HHI, RENT, MKT-SH) on 
Productivity

































































































































































Adj. R-square 0.9189 0.9192 0.9234 0.9189








Year & Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 6634 6634 6634 6634
Notes:
· Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White’s Heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
· * indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance at 15 percent level.
Table 5. (A) Productivity Estimation with Alternative Measures of Leverage
VARIABLE WITH DIFFERENT MEASURES OF LEVERAGE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: lN(GVA)
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
Measures of Leverage→ MOD-8
(tot. borr/paid-up equity 
capital)
MOD-9





























































































































Adj. R-square 0.9181 0.9181 0.9178






Year & Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 6634 6634 6634
Notes:
· Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White’s Heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
· * indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance at 15 percent level.
Table 5 (B). Productivity Estimation with Alternative Measures of Leverage
VARIABLE WITH DIFFERENT MEASURES OF LEVERAGE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN(GVA)
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
Measures of Leverage→ MOD-11



























































































































Adj. R-square 0.9178 0.9183 0.9181






Year & Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 6634 6634 6634
Notes:
· Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
· * indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
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Appendix: Variable Description
Variables Abbreviation Definition
Output Y Output measured by Gross Value added deflated by 
Wholesale price index.
Capital Ln(K) Log of Capital. Capital is defied as Gross fixed assets 
deflated by Machineries and Machine Tools Price Index.
Labour Ln(L) Log of Labour. Labour is measured by wages and Salaries 
deflated by consumer price index of industrial workers.
Insider Share INS Share of Promoter/Insider. In the estimation, it is used in 




IINV Institutional   investor’s   i.e.,   Mutual   funds,   UTI   and 
Insurance companies’ share. Measured in 0-1 scale.
Development Financial 
Institutions’ Share
DFIS Development   Financial   Institutions   i.e.,   Banks   and 
financial institutions’ Share. Measured in 0-1 scale.
Corporate Shareholding CORPORAT
E
Private corporate bodies’ share. Measured in 0-1 scale.
Foreign Shareholding FOREIGN FII+NRI/OCB’s Share. Measured in 0-1 scale.
Group Affiliation GROUP Dummy for Group Affiliation. Group=1 if affiliated to a 
business house, 0 otherwise.
Sales Ln(S) Natural Logarithm of Sales
R&D Expenditure R&D Aggregate   Research   and   Development   Expenditure 
scaled by Gross fixed assets.
Selling Expenses ADV Advertising Exp. + Marketing Exp. + Distribution Exp. 
scaled by Gross Fixed Assets
Capital Import 
Intensity
CAPIMP-INT Capital goods imports scaled by sales
Depreciation Intensity DEP-INT Depreciation provision scaled by gross fixed assets
Vertical Integration VERTICAL Ratio of Gross Value added to value of output
Excise-tax intensity EXCISE Ratio of Excise tax to value of output
Age Ln(Age) Natural Logarithm of Age.
(Age=2004 – Year of Incorporation)
Debt Intensity or 
Leverage
BORROW Total Borrowings by total assets. Used one year lagged 
values.
Short-term borrowing SHORT Short term bank loan + Commercial Paper + Debenture to 
total borrowings. Used one year lagged values.




CR4 Four firm concentration Ratio. Calculated for each NIC 2-
digit   sector   separately.   While   calculating   we   have 




HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Calculated for each NIC 2-
digit   sector   separately.   While   calculating   we   have 27  Manoranjan Pattanayak and Manoj Pant/ Working Paper (2008)  DRAFT VERSION-V01
considered all the firms in their respective sector in the 
database.
Rent RENT Rent is defined as total sales less labour, raw material, 
power and capital cost normalized by gross value added.
Market Share MKT-SH Market share of firm’ in their respective 2-digit industry 
group.
Interaction of CR4 and 
Insider Share
CR4*INS The interaction of CR4 and Insider share
Interaction of Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and 
Insider share
HHI*INS The interaction of HHI and Insider share28  Manoranjan Pattanayak and Manoj Pant/ Working Paper (2008)  DRAFT VERSION-V01
Footnotesi  There are other studies who also find a positive relationship between competition and firm performance 
including – Nickell (1996), Caves and Barton (1990), Green and Mayes (1991), Caves et al. (1992), Haskel (1991), 
Nickell et al. (1992).
ii Griffith (2001) defined group firms or firms that have subsidiary plants, sibling plants and/or foreign owned as 
Principal-agent (managerial) type firms. Sole proprietorship and partnership firms are defined as single or 
entrepreneurial firms.






C p m etc
=
= = å , where pi=market share of ith   firm in 
descending order. The normal practice is to take four firm concentration ratio. However, if the number of firms 
in the industry is more, one can calculate 8 firm or 10 firm concentration ratio.
iv Capital cost has been calculated as: total capital*user cost of capital. User cost of capital is proxied by prime 
lending rate of India’s largest commercial bank (SBI) minus  inflation plus a constant depreciation rate (7.1%). 
Total capital is defined by net worth plus total borrowings.
v For year-2001, we have taken GFA of year-2000 as K0 and the differential quantity of GFA in year-2001 and 
year-2000 as Investment. The sum of K0 and I is capital stock for year-2001.
vi Also, Ray (2004) and Caves and Bailey (1992) have used employee cost as proxy for labour.
vii The result is not reported in a table format for the sake of brevity. In the quadratic equation, the estimates of 
INS and INS
2 are 0.21 with P-value of 0.41 and 0.28 with P-value of 0.24 respectively. In the cubic specification 
though the significance level increased marginally in model-1, it is not stable. When we have introduced the 
cubic term in the fully specified model-2, we found all the insider ownership variable to be highly insignificant.
viii When we have checked the standardized estimates of each ownership variable, the beta estimates of foreign 
ownership is marginally higher than insider ownership and corporate ownership. However, there is a large 
difference between the estimates of IINV and Foreign. Foreign ownership estimate is 5 times larger than IINV 
estimates. DFI’s estimate is significantly negative.
ix Just for robustness check, we have estimated another model where we have taken only manufacturing sector 
firms. We find no change in the sign of the estimates. Also, the changes in the size and significance of the variable 
are very minimal. Hence, for our further analysis, we have taken all the industries into account except firms 
categorized as diversified.
x CR4 is four-firm concentration ratio. It is the sum total of four firms share in their respective industry group.
xi To Rajan and Zingales (1995) the most appropriate definition of financial leverage is by the ratio of debt (both 
short term and long term) to total assets. They have argued that the broadest definition of stock leverage is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
xii This is one of the several investigations which we have carried out throughout this study. The result is not 
reported for the sake of conciseness.
xiii Here caution must be exercised while interpreting competition variable (CR4). Since CR4 has been interacted 
with insider ownership variable, while interpreting the coefficient, the interaction effect must be taken into 
account.
xiv We have conducted the joint significance test for CR4, insider share and the interaction term for which the null 
hypothesis is that all these variables are jointly zero. The null hypothesis has been rejected as the value of F-
statistics is 14.80 with P-value <0.001. 
xv Some of them are reported in a table format. Others are not reported for the sake of brevity. However, the 
findings are discussed in the text.
xvi  For the sake of conciseness, we have not presented several estimation results for the robustness study. 
However, in the text we have discussed the major findings.
xvii This is the definition of Debt-Equity ratio in the PROWESS database.  The variable ‘net worth’ represents the 
share capital plus retained earnings of a company.